Category Archives: Mortgages and Foreclosure

Foreclosure Records

USA Today ran an article on foreclosure statistics. It seems that we have recently set two records.  The first is that for the first time ever 10% of all home owners (according to the article) missed a mortgage payment during a quarter.  The second is that now some 4.6% of all home owners are in foreclosure.  Gee, two records, one article.

What I find difficult to believe about this is that it says both of these percentages are of all home owners — not all home owners with mortgages.  I would believe those numbers if they are all home owners with mortgages, but considering the number of paid for properties around, it would be seriously staggering if those numbers are actually true.

Elaine

Mortgage Mods and Foreclosures

A man called me this morning who had just been served with a foreclosure Petition.  He says that he has a mortgage modification agreement negotiated with Wells Fargo.  So, they sued him anyway.  Frankly, he may be right — and he may not be.  He wanted to know what he should do about filing an answer to the foreclosure.  I told him that the first thing he needed to do was send a letter to his Congressmen.  He didn’t know who they were.

I did explain to him how to file an Answer and told him twice that he needed to file it with the Court, and that meant take it to the Court Clerk’s office and then send a copy to the foreclosure attorneys.

Still, is it any wonder that we get the legislative responses that we do out of Washington when the people who call my office don’t even know who their Congressional representatives are?

Elaine

Sheriff Sale Bidding Chaos

In Oklahoma the Sheriff’s Sale is one of the last stages in the foreclosure process.  You will find a general description of the entire Oklahoma foreclosure process on my web site’s foreclosure page.  The way Sheriff Sales work, bidding opens at 2/3 of appraised value.  Then, the bidding begins.  The mortgage company will generally have a representative there to bid on the property.  The mortgage company will be bidding with its judgment.  What that means is that as long as they don’t bid more than they are owed on the property (including sales costs, attorneys fees, court costs, etc.), then they don’t pay cash for the property.  They just exchange that much of their judgment.

So, if the mortgage company is owed a total of $95,000 on a property and buys it at Sheriff Sale for $80,000.  Then, at least in theory, the mortgage company can continue to seek the difference (called a deficiency) from the home owner or anyone else liable on the note and mortgage like a guarantor.  If the mortgage company bids $95,000, then they can’t collect any more from the home owners; because they aren’t owed any more.  What you won’t see is the mortgage company bidding more than $95,000, because then they would have to add cash to their judgment amount.  Any other bidder who wins the property must pay cash.

I just checked the Sheriff’s Sale results for Cleveland County, Oklahoma.  Twenty-two properties were sold.  Of those, twenty were bought by the mortgage company; and two were bought by a 3rd party.  Of the twenty bought by the mortgage company 11 of them were bid up to more than the appraised value for the property — in some cases a lot more.  One property sold to the mortgage company for $139,007 credit against its judgment.  The property was appraised for $95,000.

Bidding, like at all auctions, goes up in increments.  So the bidding for the property appraised for $95,000 would have started at $62,700 (2/3 of $95,000).  It would then be bid up in some kind of increments until only one bidder was left.  In most cases that last bidder was the mortgage company.  So, the mortgage company was going beyond appraised value in order to outbid people who would have paid them cash for the properties.  What is wrong with this picture?

Elaine

Mortgage Modifications and Dashed Hopes

I get a lot of calls from people trying to get some kind of mortgage modification done who are confused by the process.  I tell them to get in line.  They seem to think I’m supposed to know all the answers and have a magic guidebook telling me how to force a mortgage servicer to return phone calls, act timely, tell you in advance what they will and won’t do and finally produce the result the borrower wants.

I tell them that I don’t intervene in the loan modification process.  I don’t know anymore about it than anyone else who reads the news regularly.  I have little to no faith in mortgage servicers doing anything that is not in their best interests (and they have no real interest in mortgages performing), I think most expectations about mortgage modifications (including most that I have heard come out of government officials’ mouths) are outside the contractual rights of most servicers and to call me if they get a good result —  because I would love to hear it.

Then, they start arguing with me.

Ok, finally, some real numbers.  In today’s CNNMoney article, CNN is reporting that fewer than 5% of trial modifications done on Freddie Mac loans were being converted into permanent mods.  Across the board figures are expected to be substantially lower.

I found the reasons suggested in the article to be rather different than what I hear.  People who call me after arranging a 3-month trial mod (and going through the repeated requests for the same documentation that has already been produced multiple times to multiple servicer addresses, etc.) tell me that they have a 3-month modification and they are told that they are eligible for a permanent modification; but there are two problems.  First, they have no idea what the terms for that permanent modification will be; but they are expected to sign all kinds of binding agreements.  Second, despite being current in a temporary modification and approved for some undefined permanent modification, their foreclosure is continuing to proceed.  In one case a Sheriff’s Sale was set before the temporary modification was to be completed.  Even though the people held paperwork saying that they had been approved for a permanent modification — and if they signed all the paperwork, they might someday be told what the terms of that modification would be — of course, by then they would have lost their house at Sheriff’s Sale — details, details.

I’m still waiting for my Law School alma mater to send me the magic wand that was supposed to come with my law degree.  Until then, I am going to continue to refuse any involvement with loan modifications.

Elaine

Today I Have Hope for Real Bankruptcy Reform

Today, I have hope.

On January 6, 2009 Sen. Dick Durbin intruduced Senate bill 61, known as the Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act. Identical legislation has been introduced in the House by John Conyers. One of the objectives of this legislation is to give home owners the same ability to modify their home mortgages in Bankruptcy that rental property owners already have.

I have blogged before about the fact that if you own rental property and file for bankruptcy, you can modify the terms of the mortgages secured by those properties. Under the right circumstances you can change the principal balance, reduce the interest rate, change the monthly payment amount, even modify the right to assess and collect certain fees. If you live in the house securing the mortgage, as a general rule; you can’t change anything. You can cure an arrearage if you were behind on the mortgage at the time that you filed, but it must be done in accordance with the terms of the note and mortgage.

One of the results of the Durbin/Conyers legislation will be to level the playing field. I am a member of an organization, the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys, that is fighting for this right for our clients in Washington. We need your help. Contact your Senators and Representatives now.

To my mind there are three important points in favor of this legislation.

First, in a Country that is supposed to encourage home ownership it strikes me as wrong that landlords get better treatment in the Bankruptcy Courts than homeowners.

Second, one of the problems behind the credit crisis gripping the world economy and devestating retirement accounts and any hopes of a balanced Federal budget, is that no one really knows where mortgage losses (and other consumer debt losses) are going to stop. Modifying the mortgages will accelerate the pain, but it will help determine its full extent.

Finally, the bank lobby is telling Congress that this bill will increase the cost of mortgage loans for borrowers. In fact, they are saying essentially the same things that the Credit Card lobby (more bankers) were saying about Bankruptcy reform in 2004. According to the credit card lobbyists passing Bankruptcy reform was going to reduce the costs of credit for the average American to the tune of $400 a piece per year. Well, I don’t know about you — but I haven’t gotten my check yet.

Maybe, it is time we address the root of the financial problem instead of simply throwing more money at the banks whose rush to invest in securitized loan products that paid too much, carried too little risk and nobody really understood in the first place created the biggest mess in our lifetimes.

Elaine

It’s the Economy Stupid

I was watching election results, and saw a segment on Pennsylvania.  The gist of the segment is the reporter’s belief that Pennsylvania would have gone heavily for John McCain last spring, but the decline in the economy caused the shift to favor Obama today.  With our without Pennsylvania, the economy has certainly had a significant impact on the election.

That made me think of an article I read in USA Today this morning that Bankruptcy filings nationwide are up 40% for October, 2008 over October 2007.  That made me wonder what has happened with Oklahoma bankruptcy filings.  So, I checked.  I love Pacer.

In October, 2007 in the Western District of Oklahoma there were a total of 461 Bankruptcy cases filed.  In October, 2008 there were a total of 573 cases filed.  That is an increase of 24%.  I have done entries comparing national filing rates with ours before, and we are following an upward trend but not at nearly the same rate as nationally.  So, we are staying fairly consistent.  That is also consistent with our oil and gas economy which does tend to be somewhat counter-cyclical.

I also looked at our Chapter 13 filing rate.  As I have mentioned more than once, Chapter 13 filing rates really should not be heavily influenced by the Means Test which is the centerpiece of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2005 —  regardless of what you read in the press.  What should be the major influence on Chapter 13 filings is foreclosure rates. If you are in foreclosure, trying to save your house, and the mortgage company isn’t being helpful; a Chapter 13 can be the best thing that ever happened to you.

Although, I have seen some disturbing things in the local foreclosure statistics; I have not seen a big spike in numbers over last year.  So, I would expect our Chapter 13 numbers to have stayed pretty close to last year’s.  No surprise, there.  In October, 2007 we filed 131 Chapter 13 cases  or 28%  of the total filings.  In October, 2008 we filed 157 Chapter 13 cases or 27% of the total filings.  So, no great change there.

Well, I don’t know if anyone else found this interesting; but I did.

Elaine

Hedge Funds and Mortgage Modifications

Hedge funds are warning mortgage companies against modifying mortgages. Well, no kidding. Gee, and to think, the New York Times thought this was NEWS. Hello?

According to the New York Times (link above if you want to read the original), at least two hedge funds are sending letters to banks warning them of the banks’ contractual obligations to the investors (i.e., the hedge funds) who own the bonds and related securities collateralized by pooled mortgages. These letters supposedly warn the banks that the hedge funds might “take action” (I assume that is a polite euphemism for sue) if the banks participate in government backed plans to renegotiate delinquent mortgage loans. The hedge funds are concerned about protecting their investments. They bought bonds backed by mortgages with variable (read high) interest rates. Their cash flow, and ultimately total investment value, will be reduced if the interest rates on those mortgages is reduced — or the principal balance — or the monthly payment.

According to the New York Times this “saber-rattling highlights the conflicting interests of various players in the mortgage arena. . . . ” Well, yes.

Let’s go back to basics:

  • Mortgage pools are governed by Master Pooling and Servicing Agreements, these agreements set out each parties rights, liabilities and options;
  • Most Pooling and Servicing agreements include some provisions for modifying mortgage loans; one of the problems traditionally with getting mortgages modified (even FHA loans that have regulations requiring certain kinds of modifications) has been actual or perceived restrictions in the Pooling and Servicing agreements;
  • The servicer is the player who calls the shots, but the Servicer’s interest is for the Servicer to make money — which isn’t necessarily the same thing as for the investors to make money;
  • When the initial bailout provision was being negotiated in Congress, there was a provision to allow modification of mortgages in chapter 13 Bankruptcy included in an early draft, the banks screamed bloody murder; they made it pretty clear that they would just about not have a bailout than have that.

Now, the funny part of the article is at the end:

Officials at Braddock, a hedge fund based in Denver, said they were not against loan modifications per se but that they wanted to make sure renegotiations conformed to the contracts governing mortgages securities, which are backed by thousands of home loans. The most restrictive servicing contracts limit how many and what kinds of modifications mortgage firms can pursue. Other contracts allow the firms to pursue modification more freely if doing so will minimize overall losses. (Punctuation errors in the original.)

Ok, so before a bank — or even better the Treasury as part of its asset buyback plan — can modify a mortgage, an employee will have to identify the pool the mortgage is pooled into, obtain a copy of the Master Servicing and Pooling Agreement (a huge, densely written, pile of legalease in most cases), read it, understand it and stay within its terms. Uh huh, and these people are being paid how much?

Kind of what I thought.

Let’s stop kidding around. If we are going to start modifying mortgages to address the foreclosure rate, we have to have the authority to go outside the scope of the Pooling and Servicing Contracts. The only way that I know of to do that is by modifying Section 1322(b) of the United States Bankruptcy Code.

Elaine

Bankruptcy — Where Landlords Fare Better than Homeowners

Every time I hear on the news how concerned Congress is with helping homeowners save their homes in foreclosure, I have to change the channel. The only thing worse is when I hear how eager mortgage companies are to modify loans to help homeowners.

Ok, so I am a bleeding-heart, liberal bankruptcy lawyer. I’m supposed to react this way.

Bloomberg.com, however, is supposed to be conservative, fiscally-sensitive, pro-establishment and utterly Republican. So, what happened there this morning? Ann Woolner wrote a nice, little op-ed piece for Bloomberg.com called, Buy a Beach House for Shelter When Going Bankrupt. This Editorial is about the disparate treatment that owner-occupied real estate gets in the Bankruptcy Code over other Real Estate. For my purposes the primary Statute Section is 1322(b)(2).

The basic idea is that in most of the Bankruptcy Code you can effectively strip a secured claim down to the value of the underlying asset. You then only have to pay the asset’s value (with interest, of course) in order to keep the property. Traditionally, this was used to great effect by consumers with cars on which they were seriously underwater. That has pretty well stopped as a result of some changes to the Code in 2005. However, real estate can still be crammed down if you owe more on it than it is worth — but only if it is not the Debtor’s primary residence. If the debt is secured solely by an interest in real estate that is the Debtor’s primary residence, the loan terms cannot be modified in anyway. Residential mortgages are the ultimate sacred cow in the Bankruptcy Court.

To quote Ms. Woolner:

A speculator with slum properties all over the city, who owns a place in Manhattan and a house at the Hamptons, gets better treatment under bankruptcy law than a salaried worker’s family with only one, modest bungalow.

Now, there are a lot of parts of the Bankruptcy Code that don’t seem to make a lot of sense. Some of them are downright contradictory, and some of them are just of questionable policy. What makes this particular provision so gut-wrenchingly awful is that when the original bailout bill was being negotiated (you know, the one where the Treasury was going to buy toxic waste bonds, the one before the equity positions in banks bailout) some of the more sensible members of Congress wanted to change Section 1322 and let homeowners use the Bankruptcy Courts to reduce the principal value of their mortgages down to the value of the property. Basically, the bank and mortgage lobby told Congress they would pretty much rather not have a bailout than have that.

Oh, well. I guess I’m just not sophisticated enough to understand. After all, I never invested in completley unregulated insurance contracts insuring the lower tranches of multi-layer bonds secured by mortgages based on completely falsified loan files. So, what do I know about finance.

Elaine

Mortgage Modifications and Bailouts

As the law stands now a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the Debtor’s principal residence may not be modified in a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy.  Debtors’ attorneys have argued since the foreclosure crisis began that allowing debtors to modify their mortgages in a Chapter 13 would go a long way to resolve the problem.

A Chapter 13 Bankruptcy format gives the ability to reduce the principal balance down to the value of the property and reduce the payment accordingly.  At the mere mention of this proposal banks scream bloody murder.  So, when faced with a $700 Billion bailout; you would think that this idea would make more sense.  After all, this would write the mortgages down to the value of the collateral (which is a lesson in valuation we supposedly learned in the S & L mess) and turn a non-performing asset into a performing asset and an income stream to boot!

So, it shouldn’t come as any great surprise that this issue has raised its head again on Capital Hill this week.  The banks are still screaming bloody murder.  It really gives me pause (well, frankly, several things about this bailout give me pause, this is just one of them) when banks scream this loudly about a solution that seems to make this much sense.  Oh, wait a minute, free money is always better.

Sorry.  Not when I am paying the bill.

Write your Congressmen.  This bailout needs accountability, it needs limits, it needs oversight, it needs to be limited to certain kinds of collateralized debt (as of this morning the Treasury wanted to be able to include debt secured by credit cards, car loans and student loans as well — sorry, $700 Bn isn’t even a good start at that point).  It also needs a modicum of sense.  Using the existing Chapter 13 structure to create performing assets is a good start.

Elaine

Credit Crisis Made Easy

The New York Times has just run a lengthy article explaining how the whole mortgage-backed bond mess came to be. It is readable and easy to understand. It is called Triple-A Failure.

This article isn’t perfect. It doesn’t mention the substantial number of home owners who were defrauded by mortgage brokers. You see, many mortgage brokers were getting paid substantially more to originate high-interest rate sub-prime loans than they were good, solid, reliable prime loans. There is nothing like the smell of an extra large commission check to make a salesman behave like, well, a salesman.

It also barely mentions that virtually all forms of consumer debt have been securitized following the same models. There isn’t a guess as to the consequences of default rates edging up in those areas.

After you read this, ask yourself the following questions:

1. Why did the Federal Reserve give a massive loss guaranty to JP Morgan Chase in the takeover of Bear Sterns?

2. What can be done to hold the people who made huge profits off this stuff accountable for the fallout?

3. What is the total risk to Fannie and Freddie and what is that going to cost?

4. What exactly did we learn from the S & L crisis of the ’80’s?

5. Why are we letting banks post this stuff as collateral at the Federal Reserve window?

6. Where do we go from here?

Elaine